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The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) in its Part III which regulates 
standards of protection guaranteed to foreign investors by the ECT 
States members, together with the Article 24 of the ECT, constitutes 
a kind of autonomous investment treatment within the ECT. The ECT 
provides for a very broad spectrum of standards of protection: fair 
and equitable treatment; most constant protection and security; 
prohibition of unreasonable or discriminatory measures; „umbrella 
clause”; national treatment; most favoured-nation standard and 
effective means to assert the claims. It can be said that at the time of 
its drafting the ECT enclosed all standards of protection as recognized 
in BITs and NAFTA. There have been more than 100 publicly known 
investment arbitration cases where the ECT was invoked, more 
than 30 of which concluded by arbitral awards. This comprehensive 
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Introduction
All international investment agreements (IIAs) contain 
provisions regarding the treatment of foreign investors. The 
function of these provisions is to define measures host states are 
required to take to protect foreign investors from political risk 
that is the consequence of undertaking investment and putting 
foreign investor’s assets under the jurisdiction of the host state. 
Measures undertaken by the host country which fail to meet 
the defined standard constitute a breach of promise given by 
the host state via IIAs and thus “constitute treaty violations that 
engage the offending state’s international responsibility and 
render it potentially liable to pay compensation for the injury 
it has caused” (Salacuse 2015: 228).
In principle, IIAs do not define standards of protection but 
only refer to them. Consequently, this means that defining the 
scope of standards of protection is left mainly to the practice 
of international investment arbitral tribunals. It could be said 
that IIAs define the scope of investment protection while its 
content is found in the customary international law and the 
practice of international investment arbitral tribunals. 
The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) provides for especially broad 
protection of foreign investors (FI) and their investments. It 
contains all standards of protection developed at the time of its 
drafting and signing (1994). It entered into force in 1998 and the 
first case based on the ECT was initiated in 2001 (Nykomb v. Latvia) 
with the Award rendered in 2003. Since then and considering a 
rather slow start at the beginning, by 2017 the ECT has become the 
most frequently invoked IIA before the international investment 
arbitration (UNCTAD 2017:3). Part III of the ECT is in effect an 
investment treaty which in its Article 10(1) provides for the 
following standards of protection of foreign investments:
a) fair and equitable treatment; 
b) most constant protection and security; 
c) prohibition of unreasonable or discriminatory 
measures;
d) „umbrella clause”. Besides these standards, by its 
Article 10(7), the ECT also defines
e) national treatment and most favoured-nation 
standard, and in its Article 10(12) the standard of 
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Fair and equitable treatment
The standard of fair and equitable treatment (FET) is the 
most common standard of investment protection that can be 
found in virtually all IIAs, so it has a prominent place in the ECT 
as well. At the same time, the FET is the most frequently used 
standard of investment protection in international investor-
state disputes “present in almost every single claim brought by 
foreign investors against host State” (Yannaca-Small 2012:111). 
The purpose of this standard, as it has been applied in IIAs and 
arbitral practice, is described by Dolzer and Schreuer (2012: 
132) as a tool intended to “fill gaps which may be left by the 
more specific standards, in order to obtain the level of investor 
protection intended by treaties”. 
As IIAs like the ECT do not contain the definition of the FET, 
establishing its scope and content is left to arbitral tribunals.1 It 
is a frequently invoked standard of utmost importance, as Babić 
(2012:397) said, “The most important standard of protection 
in international investment law”, and yet it has no clear and 
defined content and there is no normative definition of the 
substance of this standard.2 According to Schill (2009:263), the 
FET is a standard which
does not have a consolidated and conventional core meaning 
as such nor is there a definition of the standard that can be 
applied easily. So far it is only settled that fair and equitable 
treatment constitutes a standard that is independent from 
national legal order and is not limited to restricting bad faith 
conduct of host States. Apart from this very minimal concept, 
however, its exact normative content is contested, hardly 
1 First IIA which provides definition of FET is CETA Art 8.10(2): „2. A Party breaches the 
obligation of fair and equitable treatment referenced in paragraph 1 if a measure or 
series of measures constitutes:  
(a) denial of justice in criminal, civil or administrative proceedings;  
(b) fundamental breach of due process, including a fundamental breach of 
transparency, in judicial and administrative proceedings, 
(c) manifest arbitrariness; 
(d) targeted discrimination on manifestly wrongful grounds, such as gender, race or 
religious belief; 
(e) abusive treatment of investors, such as coercion, duress and harassment; or 
(f) a breach of any further elements of the fair and equitable treatment obligation 
adopted by the Parties in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article.
2 According to Hober (2010:157), FET has been derived from “international law, and has, 
through its frequent applications by tribunals in BIT [bilateral investment treaties] 
and NAFTA [North American Free Trade Agreement] arbitrations, become an important 
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substantiated by State practice, and impossible to narrow 
down by traditional means of interpretative syllogism.
One of the frequent issues faced by tribunals applying the ECT 
in dealing with the FET is whether it is an independent standard 
or a standard that encompasses other standards of investment 
protection from Article 10 of the ECT. Only one Tribunal, in the 
case of Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan (Award, p. 82), concluded that FET 
standard is not an independent one but that the whole Article 
10(1) of the ECT “in its entirety is intended to ensure a fair and 
equitable treatment of investments” and consequently all above 
mentioned standards, according to this Tribunal, are rather the 
elements of the FET.
Contrary to this approach, all other tribunals applying the ECT 
concluded that the FET is an independent and autonomous 
standard. The same conclusion was reached by Scheuer (2008: 
65): “there is no doubt that it is an autonomous standard of 
protection that has given rise to numerous successful claims”.
Since the FET is frequently used by claimants and there is 
no definition of its content in the ECT, in their reasoning 
tribunals often rely on decisions by other tribunals applying 
not only the ECT, but other IIAs as well.  As stated in the case of 
Plama v. Bulgaria (Award, para.164): ”the Arbitral Tribunal will 
therefore attempt to provide a relevant definition of standards 
considering practice under the ECT and practice of tribunals 
under other investment treaties”.3
One of the characteristic of the FET in the ECT context is that 
it is “case specific” and it can be applied only if all factual 
circumstances of each specific case are taken in account.  It 
should be applied in a way that firstly enables the determination 
of its scope and definition, considering the practice of other 
arbitral tribunals. Then, as explained by the Arbitral Tribunal 
in Stati v. Kazakhstan (Award para. 944), it should be considered 
vis-à-vis the specific factual circumstances of the case, and 
finally these must be evaluated in the in the legal context of 
the ECT. 
3 Similar in Stati v. Kazakhstan (Award, para. 943.): „FET standard has been interpreted and 
applied under international law by many international investment tribunals, thereby 
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Elements of fair and equal treatment standard
There are various types of improper and discreditable 
conduct of the host state that could be considered as a violation 
of the FET and these are the elements of the content of standard 
developed through the arbitral practice. UNCTAD Study on FET 
(2012: 62) describes the following elements as relevant: 
a) defeating investors’ legitimate expectations (in balance 
with the host State’s right to regulate in public interest);
b) denial of justice and due process;
c) manifest arbitrariness in decision-making;
d) discrimination;
e) outright abusive treatment.
According to Dolzer and Scheuer (2012: 145), international legal 
scholars have identified, from the practice of arbitral tribunals, 
similar elements that are embraced by the FET like: “stability, 
transparency and investor’s legitimate expectations, due 
process, acting in good faith and freedom from coercion and 
harassment”. Jacob and Schill (2015: 719) offer similar elements 
that, according to them, can render the FET operable in practice: (a) 
principle of legality; (b) administrative due process and denial of 
justice; (c) protection of legitimate expectations; (d) requirement 
of stability, predictability and consistency regarding the legal 
framework; (e) non-discrimination; (f) transparency; and (g) 
principles of reasonableness and proportionality.4
Applying the ECT, the Tribunal in the case of Electrabel v. Hungary 
(Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and Liability 2012 
para. 7.74) followed this line of reasoning and established that 
the obligation to provide the FET comprises of several elements:
An obligation to act transparently and with due process; to 
refrain from taking arbitrary or discriminatory measures 
or from frustrating the investor’s reasonable expectations 
with respect to the legal framework adversely affecting its 
investment.
4 Similar: Babić (2012: 406): (a) protection of legitimate expectations of investors; (b) 
transparency in decision making and implementing; (c) protection of procedural 
rights of investors and (d) prohibition of harassment; Salacuse (2015:253) enumerated 
that tribunals in order to establish whether the FET was breached checked whether 
the host state has: (1) failed to protect the investor’s legitimate expectations; (2) failed 
to act transparently; (3) acted arbitrarily or subjected the investor to discriminatory 
treatment; (4) denied the investor access to justice or procedural due process or (5) acted 









XXIV (83) 2018, 
52-83
Tribunal in the case of Mamidoil v. Albania (Award 2015) defined 
four elements of the FET:
1. The provision of a stable and transparent legal framework – 
when appraising whether the principle of stability and 
transparency of legal framework has been upheld by the host 
country, overall situation in a host country should be taken 
in account: 
An investor may have been entitled to rely on Albania’s 
efforts to live up to its obligations under international 
treaties, but that investor was not entitled to believe that 
these effort would generate the same results of stability as 
in Great Britain, USA or Japan (Award 2015 para. 626).
At the same time, the investor’s conduct is of the same 
importance as the investor can rely on stability of the legal 
framework of the host state only if the investor acted with due 
diligence in estimating the overall situation in a host country. 
“The obligation of the State does not dispense the obligation 
of the investor to evaluate the circumstances. Reliance has as 
its prerequisite diligent inquiry and information” (Award 2015 
para. 634).
Based on this premise, the Tribunal adopted the approach by 
which to establish whether the FET was breached, it must appraise 
the conduct of both the host state and of the investor and put them 
in balance by considering the overall situation in the host state. 
2. Legitimate expectations – Tribunal defined that they can be 
based either on explicit representation by the host state 
(Award para. 691) or on the consistent conduct of the host 
state (Award para. 706). This distinction is of great importance 
when estimating the balance of interests of the investor 
and the host state. In earlier phases of the investment, the 
investor has a greater liberty to give up his investment but 
later, with more commitment, especially in the realm of 
funding, that possibility is reduced:
The investor’s  f lexibility is reduced the more it commits 
funds to implementation, and the gradual loss of flexibility 
increases the legitimate expectation of stability and 
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duty to pursue public policy objectives, is obliged to respect 
the legitimate expectations by pursuing the objectives 
consistently, coherently and predictably (Award para. 707).
3. The exertion of pressure on the investor by the host state – this 
is the element that is not found in the practice of other 
tribunals or writings of scholars. It has certain similarities 
with the due process but, in the specific case, the Tribunal 
concluded that the host state has a legitimate right to request 
the investor to acquire certain permits and that it cannot be 
regarded as the coercion of the harassment of the investor 
(Award para 748).
4. Denial of justice – the Tribunal determined that a claim 
for the denial of justice must not be “confounded with an 
appeal against decisions of national judiciary” (Award 
para. 746) and then described the denial of justice not as 
the prohibition and protection from wrong decisions of 
national courts but rather as “the incapability of the whole 
host state’s judicial system to provide the foreign investor 
with fair and equitable treatment” (Award para. 746). 
In the arbitral practice of the application of the ECT, the 
following FET elements have been established so far: (a) 
legitimate expectations; (b) stability of legal framework; (c) 
prohibition of the discrimination; (d) proportionality and (e) 
transparency.
 Legitimate expectations
The investor’s legitimate expectations are those the investor 
can expect from his investment, but only if he has undertaken 
all reasonable, expectable and standard steps for checking 
the situation in the host state together with all circumstances 
surrounding his investment. Such expectations are based on 
the “host state’s legal framework and on any undertakings and 
representations made explicitly or implicitly by the host state” 
(Dolzer and Scheuer 2012: 145).
As Potesta (2013: 88-112) describes, the principle of protecting the 
investor’s legitimate expectations is more and more frequently 
used in arbitral practice although its content is not defined. 
This principle is not absolute and it “does not require host state 
to freeze its legal system for the investor’s benefit” (Salacuse 
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is “sufficient to establish liability” (Bonnitcha 2014: 162) of the 
host state.
In the practice of arbitral tribunals applying the ECT, 
investors have often been invoking breach of their legitimate 
expectations as a basis of their claim.
Considering the issue of how to determine whether the conduct 
of the host state breaches the investor’s legitimate expectations, 
in the case of Al-Bahloul v. Tajikistan the Tribunal concluded 
that such decisions had to be based on several established 
factors like “the nature of the expectation, the reliance on the 
expectation and the legitimacy of that reliance” (Partial Award 
on Jurisdiction and Liability 2009 para. 200).
In the case of Plama v. Bulgaria, the Tribunal determined the 
standard of estimation of the “legitimacy” of the investor’s 
expectations, according to which the expectations ought to 
be reasonable and justifiable to be legitimate. These primarily 
include “the conditions that were specifically offered by the 
State to the Investor when making the Investment and that 
were relied upon by the Investor to make its Investment” (Award 
2008 para. 176).
The Tribunal in the case of Electrabel v. Hungary established that 
the ECT protects investors from unjustified changes of the legal 
framework but at the same time it recognized the right of the 
host state to retain possibility and flexibility of changing its 
legal framework to protect public interest in cases of changing 
circumstances. Consequently, the requirement that the host 
states respect FET standard “must not be understood as the 
immutability of the legal framework, but as implying that 
subsequent changes should be made fairly, consistently and 
predictably, taking into account the circumstances of the 
investment”( Decision on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law and 
Liability para. 7.77). Therefore, determination whether the host 
state breached the legitimate expectations of foreign investors 
and thus the FET should be based on both, the conduct of 
the investor and that of the host state: the investor’s conduct 
especially in regard to the information which he had or should 
have had (ordinary investor would have those information) at 
the time of deciding to invest; and the host state’s in regard to 
possible promises given to the investors, providing information 
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In the case of Charanne v. Spain the Tribunal stated that the 
principle of bona fide of customary international law prohibited 
the host state to attract investments by raising expectations on 
the side of foreign investors if it did not have a genuine will to 
fulfil those expectations (Award 2016 para. 486). The Tribunal 
also accepted the standard from UNCTAD study on the FET 
(UNCTAD 2012) that
an investor may derive legitimate expectations either from 
(a) specific commitments personally, for example in the form 
of stabilization clause, or (b) rules that are not specifically 
addressed to a particular investor, but which are put in place 
with a specific aim to induce foreign investment and on 
which the foreign investor relied in making his investment. 
(Award 2016 para. 489).
The Tribunal took a stance that a relevant question when 
deciding about the existence of legitimate expectations was 
whether the regulatory framework could give rise to the 
investor’s expectations that it would not be modified or altered 
to the investor’s detriment and in “the absence of a specific 
commitment, an investor cannot have a legitimate expectation 
that existing rules will not be modified” (Award 2016 para. 499). 
The Tribunal further concluded that “to convert a regulatory 
standard into a specific commitment of the state, by the limited 
character of the persons who may be affected, would constitute 
an excessive limitation on power of states to regulate the 
economy in accordance with the public interest” (Award 2016 
para 493).
In conclusion, referring to determinations in the cases Electrabel 
(see above) and El Paso v. Argentine5, the Tribunal concluded 
that the states had right to change their legal framework and 
to bring specific decisions in regard to investments but only if 
such norms were not unreasonable, arbitrary, contrary to public 
interest, disproportionate, unfair, inconsistent or in violation 
5 If the often repeated formula to the effect that “the stability of the legal and business 
framework is an essential element of fair and equitable treatment” were true, 
legislation could never be changed: the mere enunciation of that proposition shows its 
irrelevance.  Such a standard of behavior, if strictly applied, is not realistic, 
 nor is it the BITs’ purpose that States guarantee that the economic and legal conditions 
in which investments take place will remain unaltered ad infinitum.” [...] “In other 
words, the Tribunal cannot follow the line of cases in which fair and equitable 
treatment was viewed as implying the stability of the legal and business framework.  
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to the national regulatory and legislative due process (Award 
2016 para. 539).
Thus, to apply the principle of legitimate expectations, there 
should be balancing of the legitimate interests of the host state 
and of the investor. When deciding about the alleged breaches 
of FET standard, tribunals should take in account the overall 
situation in the host state and in that context estimate both 
a duty of the state to protect public interest and a legitimate 
expectation of the investor to have a stable and predictable 
legal framework. Thus, investors must accept that the legal 
framework could be changed in the interest of public policy, but 
in that case,  they have a right to demand such changes be made 
bona fide, with no discrimination or arbitrability and in public 
interest. The legitimate expectations are of extraordinary 
importance in most recent ECT cases relating to renewables. 
Due to the relevant changes in regulatory regimes in many 
states, investors are claiming that their legitimate expectations 
and thus the FET were breached by the host states. 
Stability of legal framework
This FET element is like legitimate expectations. There 
is, however, one important difference: it is more „objective 
„criterion, „it does not revolve as closely around a particular 
investor’s perspective, but instead subjects the relevant 
regulatory framework to a broader assessment“(Jacob and 
Schill 2015: 729). So, the conduct of the state is not considered in 
relation to a specific foreign investor and its expectations, but in 
relation to regulatory changes that affect all foreign investors. 
The relation between the legitimate expectations and a demand 
for the stability of a legal framework in the context of ECT is 
described in the case of Eiser v. Spain6:
Taking account of the context and of the ECT’s object and 
purpose, the Tribunal concludes that the obligation of Article 
10(1) to accord fair and equitable treatment necessarily 
embraces an obligation to provide fundamental stability in 
6 The Tribunal in Eiser v Spain (Award para. 362), among others, quoted a decision 
from the case Micula v. Romania (Award 2013 para. 666): “[T]he fair and equitable 
treatment standard does not give a right to regulatory stability per se. The state has a 
right to regulate, and investors must expect that the legislation will change, absent a 
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the essential characteristics of the legal regime relied upon 
by investors in making long-term investments.   This does 
not mean that regulatory regimes cannot evolve.  Surely, they 
can.  “[T]he legitimate expectations of any investor [...] [have] 
to include the real possibility of reasonable changes and 
amendments in the legal framework, made by the competent 
authorities within the limits of the powers conferred on 
them by the law.”  However, the obligation of Article 10(1) to 
accord fair and equitable treatment means that regulatory 
regimes cannot be radically altered when applied to existing 
investments in ways that deprive investors investing in 
reliance on those regimes of their investment’s value (Award 
2017 para. 382).
In the case of AES Summit v. Hungary, the Tribunal applied the 
ECT and decided that the request for stability as an element 
of the FET was different from a stabilization clause often 
used in commercial investment contracts. The stability clause 
guarantees that there would be no changes for a specific 
investor while a request for stabile conditions relates to a 
legal framework which is “by definition subject to change as 
it adapts to new circumstances day by day and a state has the 
sovereign right to exercise its powers which include legislative 
acts“(Award 2010 para. 9.3.29). 
Stability as the element of the FET of the ECT was not often used 
by claimants as a basis for their claims. It can be concluded that 
it has its place in those cases when the foreign investors claim 
that the system of a certain host state changed dramatically 
in relation to all investors, not only regarding those who can 
establish that they had legitimate expectations.
Denial of justice 
In its treatment of foreign investors, the host state must 
comply with the basic due process requirements. Non-
compliance with these requirements is considered a denial 
of justice and thus the breach of FET standard. The denial of 
justice is usually defined as „any gross misadministration of 
justice by domestic courts resulting from the ill-functioning 
of the State’s judicial system“(Focarelli 2013).  UNCTAD study on 
the FET (2012: 80) classified the following conduct of states likely 
to be considered the denial of justice:
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decide;
b) Unreasonable delay in proceedings;
c) Lack of a court’s independence from the legislative 
and the executive branches of the State;
d) Failure to execute final judgments or arbitral awards;
e) Corruption of a judge;
f) Discrimination against a foreign litigant;
g) Breach of fundamental due process guarantees, such 
as a failure to give notice of the proceedings and 
failure to provide an opportunity to be heard.
As Sornarajah (2010: 357) defined, the denial of justice occurs 
if a state organ conducts amounts to an act which shows such 
prejudice that “would shock the conscience of the outside 
word”.7 
The denial of justice, as an element of the FET is by looking at 
the practice of investment tribunals usually accompanied by 
a requirement for a due process. In the application of the ECT 
however only the denial of justice has been claimed so far. In 
the case of Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan, the Tribunal determined that 
collusion between the executive branch and the judiciary had 
constituted a breach of the prohibition of denial of justice and 
thus the breach of the FET standard of the ECT (Award 2005 p. 
28). 
In the case of Liman v. Kazakhstan, the Tribunal took a position 
that the denial of justice was an element of the FET and that it 
constituted the breach of the FET under the ECT (Award 2010 
para. 268) or, in other words, the FET implied that “there is no 
denial of justice”. At the same time the Tribunal emphasized 
that it is not an appellate body and “its function is not to 
correct errors of domestic procedural or substantive law which 
may have been committed by the national courts” (Award 2010 
para. 274). Regarding the scope8 of the denial of justice standard, 
the Tribunal concluded the denial of justice could only exist 
7 Paulson (2005: 98) defines the scope of denial of justice as: „ Denial of justice is always 
procedural. There may be extreme cases where the proof of the failed process is that 
the substance of a decision is so egregiously wrong that no honest or competent court 
could possibly have given it. Such cases would sanction the state’s failure to provide a 
decent system of justice. They do not constitute an international appellate review of 
national law“.
8 Tribunal (Award 2010, para. 278) quoted Award from Loewen case (para.132) when 
describing the content of the denial of justice principle: „Manifest injustice in the 
sense of a lack of due process leading to an outcome which offends a sense of judicial 
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should the court system fundamentally fail but that even “a 
misapplication of domestic procedural or substantive law 
provision might under certain circumstances be an indication 
of lack of due process “(Award 2010 para. 285). 
There are three important points that can be taken from the 
application practice of the ECT regarding the denial of justice 
as an element of the FET. The first one is that arbitral tribunals 
do not wish to act as appellate instances for the decisions of 
domestic courts. Secondly, the misapplication of material or 
procedural law is not enough to constitute the breach of the 
FET, there must be fundamental flaws in the legal system. 
Finally, the interference of the executive branch in the judicial 
process would be considered as a breach of the FET if it damaged 
the rights of the foreign investors.
Prohibition of discrimination
This standard of protection of foreign investors in the ECT 
exists simultaneously - as a separate, independent standard 
and as an element of the FET, so the main issue is how to 
distinct between these two standards. Often it is hard to make 
a distinction. Thus, the tribunals, when a discrimination of the 
foreign investor is claimed, in principle opt to establish a breach 
of discrimination as a separate standard not as an element of 
the FET. In the case of Stati v. Kazakhstan the Tribunal concluded 
that although there are two separate standards (the FET and the 
prohibition of discrimination), their scopes overlap „though it 
may be arguable to which extent (Award 2013 para. 1282).9 
In the case of Electrabel v. Hungary the Tribunal determines that 
the prohibition of discrimination on one hand falls within 
the FET „obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment 
comprises several elements, including an obligation …to refrain 
from taking arbitrary or discriminatory measures“(Award 2012 
para. 7.74) but, on the other hand, independent of the FET, there 
exists the standard of prohibition of discriminatory measures 
(Award 2012 para. 7.154).  Similar conclusion was reached in the 
case of AES v. Hungary, in which the Tribunal made a distinction 
between the FET and the prohibition of discriminatory 
9 Along the same lines in the case of AMTO v. Ukraine, the Tribunal concluded that 
there is an obvious overlap between the FET and the prohibition of discrimination 
as contained in Article 10(1) ECT so „the result is that a claimant can plead that the 
same conduct breaches various obligations in Article 10(1) in circumstances where the 
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treatment and decided to deal only with the discrimination as 
a separate standard of protection (Award 2010 para. 10.3.53). 
This distinction seems so far the only theoretical since it is hard 
to imagine how a tribunal would be able to establish distinction 
in a specific case. It is to be expected that this element of the FET 
would not be used in the future practice of application of the ECT.
Proportionality 
The principle of proportionality encompasses that “public 
measures must be appropriate for attaining the legitimate 
objectives pursued in the sense of not going beyond what is 
necessary to achieve these” (Jacob and Schill 2015: 736-737). 
When this principle is applied in international investment 
law “it implies that arbitral tribunals increasingly link fair 
and equitable treatment to the concepts of reasonableness and 
proportionality, controlling the extent to which interferences 
of host states with foreign investments are permitted” (Schill, 
S.W. and Kingsbury, B. 2011: 97).
While applying the ECT, many tribunals have determined the 
proportionality as one of the FET elements. The Tribunal in the 
case AES v. Kazakhstan concluded that 
The claimants’ claim for the breach of FET standard under 
Article 10(1) of the ECT …is well-founded to the extent that, 
in view of their drastic character and extended duration, the 
restrictions…went beyond what could have been considered 
a proportional and reasonable response…and can therefore 
not be deemed to have been justified by the underlying policy 
(Award 2003 para. 433). 
Similarly, in the case Charrane v. Spain the Tribunal determined 
that the investor had the legitimate expectations that the state, 
when changing the existing legal framework, would not act, 
among others, unproportionately (Award 2016 para. 514).10 
In the case of Electrabel v. Hungary, the Arbitral Tribunal 
defined the test which must be satisfied to regard a measure 
10 The Tribunal considered that the criterion of proportionality is “satisfied as long 
as the changes are not capricious or unnecessary and do not amount to suddenly 
and unpredictably eliminate the essential characteristics of the existing regulatory 
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as proportionate:
The test for proportionality has been developed from certain 
municipal administrative laws and requires the measure to 
be suitable to achieve a legitimate policy objective, necessary 
for that objective, and not excessive considering the relative 
weight of each interest involved (Award 2015 para. 179).
The element of proportionality as an element of the FET is being 
used extensively in the practice of the application of the ECT 
and, due to the practice of other international tribunals and 
international courts, especially the ECHR and the ECJ, it is to be 
expected that its usage will expand further.
Transparency
Transparent information on how governments implement 
and change their legal framework dealing with foreign 
investments is one of the most important determinant in 
the investment decision (OECD 2006: 12). Transparency is 
closely related to the protection of the investor’s legitimate 
expectations and thus with the FET (Dolzer and Scheuer 
2012: 149) The arbitral tribunals gradually started to include 
transparency of the element of the FET as a part of „ both the 
definitions of the conditions of the legitimate expectations 
principle and its application to the particular facts of a specific 
situation (Yanaca-Small 2012: 122).
The Arbitral Tribunal when applying the ECT in the case of Eiser 
v. Spain determined that the transparency is part of the ECT’s 
obligation to accord the FET (Award 2017 para. 379). Similarly, 
in the case of Mamidoil v. Albania the Tribunal also stated 
that a lack of transparency „may be considered unfair and 
unequitable (Award 2015 para. 599). The Tribunal in the case of 
Electrabel v. Hungary also concluded that the transparency was 
part of the obligation to provide the FET (Award 2015 para. 7.74).
Although tribunals unequivocally determined that the 
transparency is an element of FET standard of protection as 
accorded by the ECT, there were no decisions establishing the 
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Most constant protection and security
Clauses which guarantee constant protection and security 
to foreign investors are the most common ones in IIAs (Lorz 
2015: 764), but at the same time it is one of the least frequently 
applied standards of protection in arbitration practice ( Cordero 
Moss 2012: 131). This standard contains two main obligations 
on the side of host state – a passive one, to absent from the 
interference with the rights of investor and the active one, to 
prevent attacks on investors and their property and, in the case 
those have happened, to punish responsible parties (Zeitler 
2011: 183).11
The threshold for establishing that this standard has been 
violated is rather high and there is no strict liability on the 
part of the state but the obligation to act with due diligence12 
(Cordero Moss 2012: 139). There is also one unresolved issue in 
arbitral practice regarding the scope of this standard, namely 
does it relate only to physical security and protection or does it 
cover legal protection and security as well. It is undisputable 
that this standard grants physical protection  but there are 
more and more decisions in arbitral practice to the effect that 
this standard requires legal protection13 for investors as well 
(Dolzer and Scheuer 2012: 162-163). 
While interpreting the ECT, Wälde (2004: 390) stated that there 
was the argument to view this standard as “encompassing 
more than a low-level standard of police protection in a merely 
physical sense of security and rather to link it to the “economics 
police”…, now more commonly termed as “economic regulatory 
powers of the State”. A contrary position was taken by the 
Tribunal in the case Liman v. Kazakhstan – according to which 
the standard as envisioned by the ECT referred only to the 
11 In the case of Saluka v. Check Republic, Partial Award, 2006, par. 483), the Tribunal 
defined that the standard „obliges the host state to adopt all reasonable measures to 
protect assets and property from threats or attacks which may target particularly 
foreigners or certain groups of foreigners“.
12 Salacuse (2015:232) described the standard of due diligence as the situation when the 
host state „takes all the reasonable measures of protection that a well-administered 
government would take in a similar situation“.
13 One of the logical reasons for including the legal protection in this standard as well 
was given by the Tribunal in the case of Siemens v. Argentina (Award 2007, para. 303): As 
a general matter and based on the definition of investment, which includes tangible 
and intangible assets, the Tribunal considers that the obligation to provide full 
protection and security is wider than “physical” protection and security. It is difficult 
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physical security and protection (Award 2010 para. 289).
However, other tribunals when applying the ECT took the 
opposite position and, like e.g. the Tribunal in the case of AES 
v. Hungary concluded that this standard encompassed not 
only physical but also legal security and protection (Award 
2010 para. 13.3.2). It also determined that the standard was not 
one of strict liability and it did not imply that a change in law 
affecting the investor’s rights could take place, for this “would 
be practically the same as to recognizing the existence of a 
non-existent stability agreement as a consequence of the full 
protection and security standard” (Award 2010, para. 13.3.5).
In the case of Electrabel v. Hungary the Tribunal determined 
that the host state by promising full protection and security 
undertook obligation to “actively to create and maintain 
measures that promote security. The necessary measures must 
be capable of protecting the covered investment against adverse 
action by private persons” (Award 2010 para. 7.145). The Tribunal 
did not determine the scope of the standard but relied on the 
determination in the case of El Paso v. Argentine.14 
Most tribunals applying the ECT took the position that this 
standard required not only a physical but also a legal protection 
and security. It is logical for the definition of investment in 
the ECT to be extremely broad and include not only tangible 
but also intangible property, intellectual rights etc. which 
cannot be protected physically. The only solution is to interpret 
this standard as providing not only physical, but also legal 
protection and security. If not interpreted in this way, many 
investments would be excluded from the protection of the 
ECT. The standard is not of strict liability, but it requires due 
diligence on the part of the host state. 
14 El Paso v. Argentine (Award 2011, paras. 522-523): „A well-established aspect of the 
international standard of treatment is that States must use “due diligence” to prevent 
wrongful injuries to the person or property of aliens caused by third parties within 
their territory, and, if they did not succeed, exercise at least “due diligence” to punish 
such injuries.  If a State fails to exercise due diligence to prevent or punish such 
injuries, it is responsible for this omission and is liable for the ensuing damage.  It 
should be emphasized that the obligation to show “due diligence” does not mean that 
the State has to prevent each and every injury.  Rather, the obligation is generally 
understood as requiring that the State take reasonable actions within its power to 
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Unreasonable or discriminatory measures
Clauses protecting investors from unreasonable or 
discriminatory measures are part of the international 
minimum standard to be found in customary international 
law (Kriebaum 2015: 790-791) but also in many IIAs, including 
the ECT. Salacuse (2015: 273) describes three elements that must 
exist to establish the breach of this standard: 
1. there must be a “measure”;
2. such a measure must impair or negatively affect a 
protected investment; 
3. the measure must possess the specified negative 
quality required by the treaty, that is, it must be 
arbitrary, discriminatory or reasonable.
The same position was taken by the Arbitral Tribunal in the case 
of AES v. Hungary which determined that the “Hungary was thus 
obliged to avoid any impairment of Claimants’ investment as 
a consequence of either: (a) unreasonable or (b) discriminatory 
measures” (Award 2010 para. 10.3.2).  
Unreasonable measures
Since there is usually no definition of „unreasonableness“ 
in IIAs, many arbitral tribunals rely on the approach of the 
International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the ELSI case (Kriebaum 
2015:798) which defined  arbitrariness as „a wilful disregard of 
due process of law, an act which shocks, or at least surprises, a 
sense of juridical propriety“ (Judgement 1989 para. 128) .
Scheuer (2009:188) suggested the measure could be considered 
as arbitrary if it:
 — inflicts damage on the investor without serving any 
apparent legitimate purpose15;
 — is not based on legal standards but on discretion, 
prejudice, or personal preference;
 — is taken for reasons that are different from those put 
forward by the decision-maker;
15 „The decisive criterion for the determination of the unreasonable or arbitrary 
nature of measure harming the investor would be whether it can be justified in 
terms of rational reasons that are related to the facts. Arbitrariness would be absent 
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 — is taken in wilful disregard of due process and 
proper procedure.
The ECT uses the term unreasonable while in other IIAs terms 
arbitrary and unjustifiable are used (Kriebaum 2015: 792-793).  The 
practice of investment arbitral tribunals shows they took those 
two terms as synonyms. For example, the Arbitral Tribunal in 
the case of Plama v. Bulgaria concluded that “unreasonable or 
arbitrary measures - as they are sometimes referred to in other 
investment instruments, are those which are not founded in 
reason or fact but on caprice, prejudice or personal preference” 
(Award 2008 para. 184).
In the case of AES v. Hungary, the Arbitral Tribunal determined 
that it was necessary to analyse two elements to establish 
whether a state’s measure had been unreasonable: “the 
existence of a rational policy16 and the reasonableness17 of 
the act of the state in relation to the policy” (Award 2010 par. 
10.3.7). It is interesting that in this specific case the Tribunal 
concluded that the “so-called excessive profits may well give 
rise to legitimate reasons for governments to regulate or re-
regulate” (Award 2010 10.3.34).  
Discriminatory measures
IIA-s usually do not define the term discriminatory 
(Kriebaum 2015:801). It can occur in various ways, but in the 
context of foreign investments it is usually based on nationality 
(Dolzer and Scheuer 2012: 195).18 
In application of the ECT, the Tribunal in the case of Plama v. 
Bulgaria defined discriminatory measured as those which 
treated foreign investors in a way opposite to equal treatment. 
„It entails like persons being treated in different manner 
16 A rational policy is the one that is „taken by a state following a logical (good sense) 
explanation and with the aim of addressing a public interest matter“(Award 2010 para. 
10.3.8).
17 A reasonable policy is the one in which there is „an appropriate correlation between 
the state’s public policy objective and the measure adopted to achieve it. This has to do 
with the nature of the measure and the way it is implemented“(Award 2010 10.3.9).  
18 The Tribunal in the case of Lemire v. Ukraine (Decision on Jurisdiction and Liability 
2010. para. 261) described discrimination as something that „ requires more than 
different treatment. To amount to discrimination, a case must be treated differently 
from similar cases without justification; a measure must be “discriminatory and 
expose[s] the claimant to sectional or racial prejudice or a measure must “target[ed] 
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in similar circumstances without reasonable or justifiable 
grounds“ (Award 2008 para. 184).
According to Kriebaum (2015: 802), to establish whether a 
specific measure breaches the standard of prohibition of 
discrimination, the so-called triple test is often used: (1) basis 
for comparison; (2) specific measures affecting the investor 
must be established and (3) existence of factors that justify the 
difference in treatment. 
In the case of Nykomb v. Latvia (Award 2003 para. 4.3.2) the 
Arbitral Tribunal determined that:
”In evaluating whether there is a discrimination in the sense 
of the Treaty one should only “compare like with like”. Similar 
was the determination of the Tribunal in the case of Electrabel 
v. Hungary (Award 2010 para. 175), saying that for discriminatory 
treatment “comparators must be materially similar; and there 
must then be no reasonable justification for differential 
treatment”.  
In the case of AES v. Hungary, the Arbitral Tribunal concluded 
that “discrimination necessarily implies that the state benefited 
or harmed someone more in comparison with the generality” 
(Award 2010 10.3.53). 
The arbitral tribunals in principle took position that the 
existence of discriminatory intent on the part of the state was 
not necessary for the measure to be discriminatory, e.g. the 
Tribunal in the case of Electrabel v. Hungary took a position that 
“discriminatory effects of the measures are sufficient to breach 
the prohibition. There is no need to prove discriminatory 
intent” (Award 2012 para. 7.152). 
Although this standard of protection is often used in the 
practice of arbitral tribunals applying other IIAs, especially 
NAFTA, it has been rarely used in the practice of application of 
the ECT. One of the reasons could be the nature of investment 
in energy sector and the fact that the ECT is primarily used 
in cases involving the EU Member States in which there exist 
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Umbrella clause 
An umbrella clause provides a guarantee that the host 
state will respect all obligations it has undertaken regarding 
foreign investors, it “allows investors to bring any claim for 
the breach of an investment-related promise made by the host 
State under the jurisdiction of a treaty-based tribunal “ (Schill 
2009: Abstract). Such a clause is called “umbrella” because it 
puts contractual rights under the “protective umbrella” of the 
investment treaties (Hobér 2008: 575). It has also been called a 
“mirror clause” and pacta sunt servanda clause (Wong 2006: 144). 
As Salacuse stated (2015: 306), the scope of the umbrella clause 
is to 
in effect make the respect by host governments of all their 
commitments to investors a treaty obligation governed by 
international law and all disputes related to their failure to 
fulfil those commitments potentially subject to international 
arbitration.
As Whitsitt and Bankes (2013: 234) describe, “umbrella clauses 
are particularly significant in those economic sectors (such 
as the energy sector) where there might be significant state 
involvement either as owner of the resource or as owners of 
significant facilities”. 
The umbrella clause from Article 10(1) of the ECT is considered 
one of the most extensive umbrella clauses in IIAs (De 
Brabandere 2014: 162). A definition of the scope of the umbrella 
clause in the ECT was given by the Swiss First Civil Law Court 
in the process of the annulment of arbitral Award in the case 
of EDF v. Hungary: 
The umbrella clause puts the contract concluded by the 
investor with the host state directly under the protection of 
the bilateral or multilateral treaty protecting investments, 
with that treaty shielding the contract under its ‘umbrella’, 
so that any disregard of a contractual obligation will ipso 
facto also be a breach of an international commitment and 
the contract claims in connection with this may be invoked 










XXIV (83) 2018, 
52-83
The Energy Charter Treaty Secretariat provided an opinion that 
the umbrella clause “covers any contract that a host country 
has concluded with a subsidiary of the foreign investor in the 
host country, or a contract between the host country and the 
parent company of the subsidiary” (ECT Secretariat 2002: 26). It 
was supported by the determination of the Tribunal in the case 
of AMTO v. Ukraine which defined that the umbrella clause of the 
ECT created a responsibility of the host state not only in respect 
of the direct investor but also vis-a-vis its subsidiary company 
if organized in that state (Award 2008 para.110).
In the case of Khan v. Mongolia, the Arbitral Tribunal recognized, 
through the application of the umbrella clause, the breach of 
the domestic law as the breach of the ECT. It means that when 
the host state breaches its own law, it simultaneously breaches 
the ECT and the investor can seek the protection of the ECT 
(Award 2015 para. 295).
In the case of Liman v. Kazakhstan, the Tribunal determined two 
elements in relation to the ECT’s umbrella clause: (1) that the 
umbrella clause encompasses an “abstract unilateral promise 
by the state in its national legislation and particularly in its 
laws directed to foreign investors” (Award 2015 para. 458); (2) 
when applying the domestic laws, national courts are free in 
their decision and the umbrella clause cannot be applied for 
the court’s decisions (Award 2015 para. 450)
The practice of application of the ECT has yet to take position 
regarding one of the most important issues concerning 
the umbrella clause, namely whether it encompasses only 
substantial issues (narrow approach) or jurisdictional as well 
(broad approach). To put it differently, can a foreign investor 
apply the umbrella clause from the ECT to get jurisdiction of 
some forum envisaged by the ECT but not by the commercial 
contract or other agreement? Although there is no decision 
regarding this issue, one would expect that the tribunals 
would take the position that it does cover jurisdictional issues 
as well, but only provided there is no specific provision saying 
otherwise in the basic contract. This expectation is based on a 
very broad content of the umbrella clause in the ECT, the so far 
practice of the application of the ECT and a tendency to provide 
investors with a wide spectrum of protection, and finally, on 
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National treatment
Almost all IIA-s contain national treatment (NT) provisions 
requiring host states to accord to foreign investors and their 
investments “treatment no less favourable than that accorded 
to their own investors and investments” (Reinsch 2015: 847). 
The rationale behind this standard is to ensure a degree of 
competitive equality between national and foreign investors 
(UNCTAD 1999: executive summary). The aim of this standard 
is to prevent host governments from undertaking various 
measures resulting in “negative differentiation between foreign 
and national investors… and thus to promote the position of the 
foreign investor to the level accorded to nationals (Dolzer and 
Scheur 2012: 198). 
The practice of investment arbitration has developed a three-
step test, the same as the one used for establishing whether 
discrimination occurred. Salacuse (2015: 277) described the test 
as follows:
The first step involves identifying a group of national 
investors to be compared with the claimant foreign investor. 
The second step is to compare the relative treatment the two 
groups have received and evaluate whether the treatment 
of the claimant is less favourable than that given to the 
compared group of national investors. The final step is to 
determine whether the two are…in “like circumstances” or 
whether factors justifying differential treatment exist.19
The analysis of the practice of the Arbitral Tribunals applying 
the ECT shows that the standard of NT as defined in Article 10(7) 
of the ECT is rarely used and there is no award based on this 
standard. Foreign investors prefer to claim discriminatory 
treatment (breaches of Article 10(3) of the ECT). Since the same 
test applies for breaches of both standards, results are the same. 
One of the reasons for such an approach is probably the 
reasoning of the Tribunal in the case of Nykomb v. Latvia. 
The Arbitral Tribunal established that Latvia breached its 
obligation not to discriminate a claimant, but then had refused 
to establish whether other standards had also been breached as 
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claimed (including the one of NT) because ”in order to establish 
liability for the Republic it is strictly speaking sufficient to find 
that one of the relevant provisions has been violated” (Award 
2003 para. 4.3.2).20 
The Arbitral Tribunal in the case of AES v. Hungary applied 
the same test for establishing whether the prohibition of 
discrimination had been breached as for the standard of NT 
(Award 2010 para. 11.3.2) and concluded that breach of those 
standards “necessarily implies that the state benefited or 
harmed someone more in comparison with the generality” 
(Award 2010 para. 10.3.53). 
Most favoured nation treatment
IIAs regularly contain a most favoured-nation (MFN) clauses 
(Reinisch 2015: 808). The purpose of MFN clauses is to “prevent 
host states from treating investors and investments of its 
treaty partners [other states members of the specific IIA] less 
favourably than investors from third countries” (Salacuse 2015: 
280). It is important to emphasize that this standard does not 
require the standard of equal treatment but only the standard 
of “no less favourable” treatment.   
The so far practice of the application of the ECT shows no 
cases in which this standard had been applied, except in 
the case of AES v. Hungary in which the Tribunal found no 
breach of the MFN clause. Since the alleged breach of the MFN 
treatment obligation has been based on the same facts as 
alleged discriminatory measure and the Tribunal has found 
no discriminatory measure, there has obviously been no breach 
of MFN treatment (Award 2010 para. 12.3.2). 
The Arbitral Tribunal in the case of Plama v. Bulgaria considered 
the issue whether the MFN treatment applied to dispute 
settlement provisions or it only related to standards of protection. 
It concluded it could not apply to dispute settlement provisions 
because “an MFN provision in a basic treaty does not incorporate 
20 It is interesting that prof Wälde as an expert witness (Legal Opinion para. 47) in 
Nykomb case predicted: "Discrimination ("national treatment") has again been largely 
dormant in the past, but has recently been revived vigorously as arbitral tribunals 
(and counsel) have discovered that behind many actions affecting foreign investors is 
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by reference dispute settlement provisions in whole or in part 
set forth in another treaty, unless the MFN provision in the basic 
treaty leaves no doubt that the Contracting Parties intended to 
incorporate them “ (Decision on Jurisdiction 2005 para. 223).
Existence of effective means to assert the claims
The obligation of host states to ensure that their legal 
frameworks provide effective means for the assertion of claims 
and the enforcement of rights with respect to investments, 
investment agreements, and investment authorizations is 
contained in Article 10(12) of the ECT. This standard appeared 
in IIAs recently, mainly through BITs concluded with the USA 
(Haeri and Dağli 2016: 3). In order not to breach this standard, 
the host state must provide foreign investors not only with an 
appropriate institution (in principle court) before which they 
can protect their rights, but also it must provide them with 
effective means of enforcement of their rights.
This clause was used for the first time in investment arbitration 
practice in the case of Petrobart v. Kyrgyzstan. The Arbitral 
Tribunal did not define the scope of this standard but decided 
that direct governmental intervention into a specific court 
proceeding breached the obligation to provide effective means 
for the assertion of claims (Award 2005 para. 82).  
In the case of AMTO v. Ukraine, the Arbitral Tribunal defined 
that the fundamental criterion for establishing the existence 
of effective means to assert the claim is an effective system for 
the protection of investor’s rights, there must be “law and rule 
of the law”: 
An effective means of the assertion of claims and the 
enforcement of rights also requires secondary rules of 
procedure so that the principles and objectives of the 
legislation can be translated by the investor into effective 
action in the domestic tribunals (Award 2008 para. 87).
The last publicly available arbitral award dealing with this 
standard was in the case of Charanne v. Spain, also in application 
of the ECT. The Arbitral Tribunal determined that “the standard 
of effective mechanisms as foreseen in Article 10(12) of the ECT 









XXIV (83) 2018, 
52-83
effective remedies to investors for realization and protection 
of their investments”(Award 2016 para. 470). The Tribunal also 
made one important conclusion regarding the “quality” of 
the standard and stated that it did not impose on a state how 
to organize its judicial system. It only required it had to be 
adequate and effective (Award 2026 para. 470). 
The practice of applying the ECT is rather “revolutionary” in 
this regard since, according to public information, the very 
first and the last award based on this standard was in cases 
of application of the ECT. Thus, investment tribunals applying 
other IIAs extensively relied on the practice of application 
of the ECT. There are few important points taken by arbitral 
tribunals regarding this standard: (a) when deciding about 
possible breach of the standard. The Tribunals should consider 
the legal system as a whole, not only one isolated case or court 
decision; (b) the state must provide such a legal framework 
that provides investors with effective remedies for protection 
of their rights and (c) there is no universal standard how the 
state must organize its legal system, it only must be adequate 
and effective.
Conclusion
At the time of its signing, the ECT was the most advanced 
IIA regarding the scope of standards of protection of foreign 
investors and their investments. Part III of the ECT containing 
standards of protection, and Article 26 of the ECT containing 
the ways of protection themselves represent a kind of a 
separate investment treaty within the ECT. The following 
conclusions follow from the analysis of the arbitral practice of 
the application of standards of protection of the ECT. The ECT 
encompasses the results of the application of various bilateral 
investment treaties and NAFTA by arbitral tribunals. At the 
beginning of the application of the ECT, arbitral decisions were 
influenced by decisions and attitudes of arbitral tribunals 
applying other IIAs, but arbitral decisions applying the ECT 
gradually started to exert a greater influence at arbitral 
tribunals applying other IIAs. 
The most frequently used standard of protection in the practice 
of the application of the ECT is definitely FET standard. So 
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(a) legitimate expectations; (b) stability of legal framework; 
(c) prohibition of discrimination; (d) proportionality and (e) 
transparency. The FET was defined by considering the practice 
under the ECT and the practice of tribunals under other 
investment treaties and by applying that definition on all the 
factual circumstances of each specific case. In establishing 
whether the FET was breached, the tribunals appraised the 
conduct of both the host state and of the investor and put them 
in balance by considering the overall situation in the host state. 
The most frequently used element of the FET in the practice of 
the application of the ECT are legitimate expectations.
Regarding the standard of most constant protection and 
security, most tribunals applying the ECT took the position 
that this standard required not only a physical, but also a legal 
protection and security. It is not a standard of strict liability, the 
state must act with due diligence in both prevention, and if that 
failed, then in repression against responsible persons. Also, the 
application of the standard of existence of effective means to 
assert the claims is very important for the ECT because that 
standard has been developed from the practice of the tribunals 
applying the ECT, and many tribunals applying other IIAs relied 
on this practice. 
The practice of ECT tribunals regarding the scope and 
application of standards of protections of foreign investors and 
their investments became the integral part of the practice of 
international investment law. The ECT has recently become the 
most frequently invoked IIA before investment arbitrations. It is 
thus to be expected that its importance and influence will rise. 
Likewise, the nature of investments in energy sector with less 
“strategic” and huge investments and more and more medium 
and small investments results in the growth of arbitral cases. 
This is especially case regarding renewables and changes in 
regulatory framework happening in the EU in recent years.
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